The important and still current analysis of Franz Fanon: How to decolonialize the world?
Category: World-Peacemaker
In analyzing the obstacles to democratization in post- independence Africa, Mahmood Mamdani offers a bold, insightful account of colonialism’s legacy – a bifurcated power that mediated racial domination through tribally organized local authorities, reproducing racial identity in citizens and ethnic identity in subjects.
In analyzing the obstacles to democratization in post- independence Africa, Mahmood Mamdani offers a bold, insightful account of colonialism’s legacy–a bifurcated power that mediated racial domination through tribally organized local authorities, reproducing racial identity in citizens and ethnic identity in subjects. Many writers have understood colonial rule as either “direct” (French) or “indirect” (British), with a third variant–apartheid–as exceptional. This benign terminology, Mamdani shows, masks the fact that these were actually variants of a despotism. While direct rule denied rights to subjects on racial grounds, indirect rule incorporated them into a “customary” mode of rule, with state-appointed Native Authorities defining custom. By tapping authoritarian possibilities in culture, and by giving culture an authoritarian bent, indirect rule (decentralized despotism) set the pace for Africa; the French followed suit by changing from direct to indirect administration, while apartheid emerged relatively later. Apartheid, Mamdani shows, was actually the generic form of the colonial state in Africa.
Through case studies of rural (Uganda) and urban (South Africa) resistance movements, we learn how these institutional features fragment resistance and how states tend to play off reform in one sector against repression in the other. Reforming a power that institutionally enforces tension between town and country, and between ethnicities, is the key challenge for anyone interested in democratic reform in Africa.
The Politics of Decentralized Despotism
“This theoretically adventurous work by a prominent Ugandan academic attempts to shift away from current paradigms constructed around themes of ethnic identity and the role of civil society. . . . This is an original book that offers a new angle of vision and is likely to stir up lively debate.”—Foreign Affairs
Here you can read: Mamdani Mahmood Citizen and Subject Chapter 1 and 4.pdf
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Mahmood Mamdani’s Citizen and Subject, 20 years later
I first encountered Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism early in graduate school, in a class I took for its intriguing title – “Colonial Law and the Modern State.” In that class, and then in “Major Debates in the Study of Africa,” we were guided by Mahmood through Citizen and Subject and through the literature that went into shaping it; I subsequently came out of graduate school under the impression that everybody who studies African politics spends weeks reading Henry Sumner Maine’s Ancient Law and Jan Smuts’s lectures. After that experience, it was perhaps inevitable that Citizen and Subject’s framework for grasping the specificity of the political in Africa would shape the intellectual trajectories of many of us in those classes – it certainly did mine – as well as of many of those who studied with Mahmood in the decades before and the decades since.
Citizen and Subject has been particularly close to my mind of late, for this term is first time I have actually taught the book. For the last few years, during which I worked alongside Mahmood at the Makerere Institute of Social Research in Kampala, Uganda, Mahmood was there to teach Citizen and Subject himself. But now, running my own classes on African politics at Cambridge University, I have realized how essential the book remains. It is unparalleled in its ability to re-frame the polarized and reductive debates that are still the substance of Africanist political science, just as they were 20 years ago – debates over concepts like clientelism, corruption, democratization, ethnic violence, or civil society. And so when students ask, “but what’s the alternative?” there is almost always some place in Citizen and Subject to point to.
The book’s pedagogical importance derives from its method: at each step, a dominant debate is identified and the common presumption shared by the opposing sides to that debate revealed. The book thus seeks “to problematize both sides of every dualism by historicizing it, thereby underlining the institutional and political condition for its reproduction and for its transformation” (299). What a salutary change it would be if this one sentence were to replace the inevitable litany of focus group discussions and key informant interviews found in the “Methodology” sections of too many African politics research proposals!
The book’s method, in turn, derives from its understanding of political reality. It identifies the contradictory nature of all movements, all struggles, all efforts at reform, whether by state or by society. It shows how those efforts are shaped by the political structures they seek to transform, and so may end up reproducing those structures in the very effort to overcome them. Politics is a field of dilemmas, and transformation is tenuous and partial even in the best of circumstances. So there is no singular revolutionary moment but always multiple, allied but contradictory, processes of reform, as the dilemmas of state and social power are identified and negotiated. But this also means there is always cause for optimism, always an emancipatory moment that can be identified, proclaimed, and redeemed. Politics thus has an ineradicable intellectual dimension, for, as the book puts it, “analytical failures can become political failures” (29) – but analytical progress can also, thereby, help enable political progress.
Citizen and Subject is a call for the reform of the study of African politics, and itself exemplifies that reformed discipline. It declares its endeavor as being “to establish the historical legitimacy of Africa as a unit of analysis” (13). The “starting point” in this “creation of a truly African studies” is thus to establish “the commonality of the African experience, [which] seems imperative at this historical moment” (31). Once this specificity of the African experience is grasped, genuinely comparative global studies can proceed.
The book seeks the content of Africa’s specificity by tackling head-on what is typically seen as the continent’s irreconcilable internal difference: South Africa. Taking South Africa as part of Africa, the book argues, can best reveal what is common to the continent as a whole. Its unwavering commitment to bring South Africa back in, however, remains as uncommon today as it was twenty years ago.
And so the question of South Africa and African studies remains imperative. In fact, the question has received fresh political impetus by #RhodesMustFall at the University of Cape Town, #OpenStellenbosch, and other struggles in South Africa, whose demand to decolonize knowledge by bringing Africa into the curriculum – thus establishing a genuine African studies in South Africa – is paired with demands for the broader decolonization of the university.
Citizen and Subject, of course, has decolonization at its center, and explores the dilemmas of the vast efforts after independence to decolonize civil society, including decolonizing universities and the curriculum. Indeed, the decolonization of knowledge production was the substance of state intervention and social struggle from Makerere to Ibadan for years. This history of actually existing efforts at decolonizing knowledge production in Africa, however, raises a complex question for today’s struggles in South African universities. We might ask whether, by framing the task of radically transforming the university and establishing African studies in South Africa as decolonization, today’s South African struggles risk being temporally out of joint with struggles around justice in knowledge production elsewhere in Africa.
From a perspective outside South Africa, to represent the demand for justice in knowledge production today as the need for decolonization may appear outdated or paying short shrift to the ambiguities of actually existing decolonization. Elsewhere in Africa, the key task in justice in knowledge production may appear differently: Mahmood has often framed the Makerere Institute of Social Research’s objective as being to study the world from Africa, and not to study Africa as divorced from the world. I see this project as an effort to fulfill Citizen and Subject’s call for genuinely comparative study, in which Africa is a unit of analysis, thus breaking free from the limitations of African area studies while not ignoring Africa’s specificity.
And so the efforts to establish a decolonized African studies in South Africa may need to engage with actually existing struggles over justice in knowledge production throughout Africa, past and present, if they are not to risk confirming South African exceptionalism – and African idiosyncrasy – in the very attempt to overcome that exceptionalism. This is precisely this kind of dilemma that Citizen and Subject helps alert us to in the broad process of decolonization. The effort to study the world from Africa may thus be the counterpoint that ensures African studies does not amount to an assertion of Africa’s idiosyncrasy. The South African student activists’ decision to put questions of intersectionality, patriarchy, and a living wage at the center of their agenda may represent this kind of counterpoint, opening decolonization up to analytical and political engagement beyond South Africa. Conversely, the demand for decolonization may be the counterpoint that ensures that “studying the world from Africa” starts from an engagement with Africa’s specific history and is not co-opted by neoliberalism’s “centers of excellence” and “world-class universities.”
Beyond Africa, the demand to decolonize knowledge and the university has resonated widely. In the UK, there is Rhodes Must Fall at Oxford and “Why is My Curriculum White” at the University of London. And of course, while Henry Sumner Maine and Jan Smuts may have been forgotten to students of Africanist political science, they are still very much present at Cambridge. The call to Decolonize Cambridge, to rethink the curriculum, to raise questions of access and representation, have increasing political heft in this post-colonialist context.
In many other places across the world with their own specific histories of relations with Africa, such as the Americas, the question of African studies is similarly provoking debates around justice in knowledge production. And perhaps the widespread rise in interest in the study of Africa globally, for instance in India, China, or Turkey, can lead the question of African studies to play a critical role in generating a broad re-thinking of global knowledge production and of the politics of the university. Critical debates around African studies – asking both about a decolonized study of Africa and a globalized study of the world from Africa – need to be cultivated in these many locations, thus helping to develop novel intellectual responses to the epochal political transformations we are seeing today. Which refers back to what I see as being the central lesson of Citizen and Subject: that it is the task of critical intellectual work to engage concrete political struggles, identify their emancipatory moments whatever their immediate limitations, and let this optimism help open the field of political possibility.
*Branch first made these comments at a special roundtable at the African Studies Association in San Diego in November 2015 on the twentieth anniversary of the publication, in 1995, of Mamdani’s Citizen and Subject.The panelists were former Mamdani students Suren Pillay, Juan Obarrio and Manuel Schwab.
http://africasacountry.com/2015/12/mahmood-mamdanis-citizen-and-subject-twenty-years-later/
The African wars from within: Professor Mahmood Mamdani debates children and conflict for UNICEF
The power elite: C. Wright Mills produced the influential book The Power Elite in 1956, six years before his death. The power elite, according to Mills, is composed of men who occupy positions of authority in major institutions and organizations in the economic, political, and military arenas. These men are wealthy, have prestigious jobs, and wield extraordinary decision making powers. Even their decisions not to act can be influential. The concentration of wealth and power into the hands of the few is especially noteworthy, according to Mills, as economic, political, and military institutions are more connected than separate.
Maverick sociologist and social critic C. Wright Mills produced the influential book The Power Elite in 1956, six years before his death. The power elite, according to Mills, is composed of men who occupy positions of authority in major institutions and organizations in the economic, political, and military arenas. These men are wealthy, have prestigious jobs, and wield extraordinary decision making powers. Even their decisions not to act can be influential. The concentration of wealth and power into the hands of the few is especially noteworthy, according to Mills, as economic, political, and military institutions are more connected than separate.
Full text: http://www.eindtijdinbeeld.nl/EiB-Bibliotheek/Boeken/The_Power_Elite_-_New_Edition__first_full-scale_study_of_structure_and_distribution_of_power_in_USA___2000_.pdf
Slideshow
THE POWER ELITE
C. Wright Mills
The powers of ordinary men are circumscribed by the everyday worlds in which they live, yet even in these rounds of job, family, and neighborhood they often seem driven by forces they can neither understand nor govern. ‘Great changes’ are beyond their control, but affect their conduct and outlook none the less. The very framework of modern society confines them to projects not their own, but from every side, such changes now press upon the men and women of the mass society, who accordingly feel that they are without purpose in an epoch in which they are without power. But not all men are in this sense ordinary. As the means of information and of power are centralized, some men come to occupy positions in American society from which they can look down upon, so to speak, and by their decisions mightily affect, the everyday worlds of ordinary men and women. They are not made by their jobs; they set up and break down jobs for thousands of others; they are not confined by simple family responsibilities; they can escape. They may live in many hotels and houses, but they are bound by no one community. They need not merely ‘meet the demands of the day and hour’; in some part, they create these demands, and cause others to meet them. Whether or not they profess their power, their technical and political experience of it far transcends that of the underlying population. (What Jacob Burckhardt said of ‘great men,’ most Americans might well say of their elite: ‘They are all that we are not.’)1 The power elite is composed of men whose positions enable them to transcend the ordinary environments of ordinary men and women; they are in positions to make decisions having major consequences. Whether they do or do not make such decisions is less important than the fact that they do occupy such pivotal positions: their failure to act, their failure to make decisions, is itself an act that is often of greater consequence than the decisions they do make. For they are in command of the major hierarchies and organizations of modern society. They rule the big corporations. They run the machinery of the state and claim its prerogatives. They direct the military establishment. They occupy the strategic command posts of the social structure, in which are now centered the effective means of the power and the wealth and the celebrity which they enjoy. 1 Jacob Burckhardt, Force and Freedom (New York: Pantheon Books, 1943), pp. 303ff. 1 The power elite are not solitary rulers. Advisers and consultants, spokesmen and opinionmakers are often the captains of their higher thought and decision. Immediately below the elite are the professional politicians of the middle levels of power, in the Congress and in the pressure groups, as well as among the new and old upper classes of town and city and region. Mingling with them, in curious ways which we shall explore, are those professional celebrities who live by being continually displayed but are never, so long as they remain celebrities, displayed enough. If such celebrities are not at the head of any dominating hierarchy, they do often have the power to distract the attention of the public or afford sensations to the masses, or, more directly, to gain the ear of those who do occupy positions of direct power. More or less unattached, as critics of morality and technicians of power, as spokesmen of God and creators of mass sensibility, such celebrities and consultants are part of the immediate scene in which the drama of the elite is enacted. But that drama itself is centered in the command posts of the major institutional hierarchies. 1 The truth about the nature and the power of the elite is not some secret which men of affairs know but will not tell. Such men hold quite various theories about their own roles in the sequence of event and decision. Often they are uncertain about their roles, and even more often they allow their fears and their hopes to affect their assessment of their own power. No matter how great their actual power, they tend to be less acutely aware of it than of the resistances of others to its use. Moreover, most American men of affairs have learned well the rhetoric of public relations, in some cases even to the point of using it when they are alone, and thus coming to believe it. The personal awareness of the actors is only one of the several sources one must examine in order to understand the higher circles. Yet many who believe that there is no elite, or at any rate none of any consequence, rest their argument upon what men of affairs believe about themselves, or at least assert in public. There is, however, another view: those who feel, even if vaguely, that a compact and powerful elite of great importance does now prevail in America often base that feeling upon the historical trend of our time. They have felt, for example, the domination of the military event, and from this they infer that generals and admirals, as well as other men of decision influenced by them, must be enormously powerful. They hear that the Congress has again abdicated to a handful of men decisions clearly related to the issue of war or peace. They know that the bomb was dropped over Japan in the name of the United States of America, although they were at no time consulted about the matter. They feel that they live in a time of big decisions; they know that they are not making any. Accordingly, as they consider the present as history, they infer that at its center, making decisions or failing to make them, there must be an elite of power. On the one hand, those who share this feeling about big historical events assume that there is an elite and that its power is great. On the other hand, those who listen carefully to the reports of men apparently involved in the great decisions often do not believe that there is an elite whose powers are of decisive consequence. Both views must be taken into account, but neither is adequate. The way to understand the power of the American elite lies neither solely in recognizing the historic scale of events nor in accepting the personal awareness reported by men of apparent decision. Behind such men and behind the events of history, linking the two, are the 2 major institutions of modern society. These hierarchies of state and corporation and army constitute the means of power; as such they are now of a consequence not before equaled in human history—and at their summits, there are now those command posts of modern society which offer us the sociological key to an understanding of the role of the higher circles in America. Within American society, major national power now resides in the economic, the political, and the military domains. Other institutions seem off to the side of modern history, and, on occasion, duly subordinated to these. No family is as directly powerful in national affairs as any major corporation; no church is as directly powerful in the external biographies of young men in America today as the military establishment; no college is as powerful in the shaping of momentous events as the National Security Council. Religious, educational, and family institutions are not autonomous centers of national power; on the contrary, these decentralized areas are increasingly shaped by the big three, in which developments of decisive and immediate consequence now occur. Families and churches and schools adapt to modern life; governments and armies and corporations shape it; and, as they do so, they turn these lesser institutions into means for their ends. Religious institutions provide chaplains to the armed forces where they are used as a means of increasing the effectiveness of its morale to kill. Schools select and train men for their jobs in corporations and their specialized tasks in the armed forces. The extended family has, of course, long been broken up by the industrial revolution, and now the son and the father are removed from the family, by compulsion if need be, whenever the army of the state sends out the call. And the symbols of all these lesser institutions are used to legitimate the power and the decisions of the big three. The life-fate of the modern individual depends not only upon the family into which he was born or which he enters by marriage, but increasingly upon the corporation in which he spends the most alert hours of his best years; not only upon the school where he is educated as a child and adolescent, but also upon the state which touches him throughout his life; not only upon the church in which on occasion he hears the word of God, but also upon the army in which he is disciplined. If the centralized state could not rely upon the inculcation of nationalist loyalties in public and private schools, its leaders would promptly seek to modify the decentralized educational system. If the bankruptcy rate among the top five hundred corporations were as high as the general divorce rate among the thirty-seven million married couples, there would be economic catastrophe on an international scale. If members of armies gave to them no more of their lives than do believers to the churches to which they belong, there would be a military crisis. Within each of the big three, the typical institutional unit has become enlarged, has become administrative, and, in the power of its decisions, has become centralized. Behind these developments there is a fabulous technology, for as institutions, they have incorporated this technology and guide it, even as it shapes and paces their developments. The economy—once a great scatter of small productive units in autonomous balance—has become dominated by two or three hundred giant corporations, administratively and politically interrelated, which together hold the keys to economic decisions. The political order, once a decentralized set of several dozen states with a weak spinal cord, has become a centralized, executive establishment which has taken up into itself many powers previously scattered, and now enters into each and every crany of the social structure. The military order, once a slim establishment in a context of distrust fed by state militia, 3 has become the largest and most expensive feature of government, and, although well versed in smiling public relations, now has all the grim and clumsy efficiency of a sprawling bureaucratic domain. In each of these institutional areas, the means of power at the disposal of decision makers have increased enormously; their central executive powers have been enhanced; within each of them modern administrative routines have been elaborated and tightened up. As each of these domains becomes enlarged and centralized, the consequences of its activities become greater, and its traffic with the others increases. The decisions of a handful of corporations bear upon military and political as well as upon economic developments around the world. The decisions of the military establishment rest upon and grievously affect political life as well as the very level of economic activity. The decisions made within the political domain determine economic activities and military programs. There is no longer, on the one hand, an economy, and, on the other hand, a political order containing a military establishment unimportant to politics and to moneymaking. There is a political economy linked, in a thousand ways, with military institutions and decisions. On each side of the world-split running through central Europe and around the Asiatic rimlands, there is an ever-increasing interlocking of economic, military, and political structures.2 If there is government intervention in the corporate economy, so is there corporate intervention in the governmental process. In the structural sense, this triangle of power is the source of the interlocking directorate that is most important for the historical structure of the present. The fact of the interlocking is clearly revealed at each of the points of crisis of modern capitalist society—slump, war, and boom. In each, men of decision are led to an awareness of the interdependence of the major institutional orders. In the nineteenth century, when the scale of all institutions was smaller, their liberal integration was achieved in the automatic economy, by an autonomous play of market forces, and in the automatic political domain, by the bargain and the vote. It was then assumed that out of the imbalance and friction that followed the limited decisions then possible a new equilibrium would in due course emerge. That can no longer be assumed, and it is not assumed by the men at the top of each of the three dominant hierarchies. For given the scope of their consequences, decisions—and indecisions—in any one of these ramify into the others, and hence top decisions tend either to become co-ordinated or to lead to a commanding indecision. It has not always been like this. When numerous small entrepreneurs made up the economy, for example, many of them could fail and the consequences still remain local; political and military authorities did not intervene. But now, given political expectations and military commitments, can they afford to allow key units of the private corporate economy to break down in slump? Increasingly, they do intervene in economic affairs, and as they do so, the controlling decisions in each order are inspected by agents of the other two, and economic, military, and political structures are interlocked. At the pinnacle of each of the three enlarged and centralized domains, there have arisen those higher circles which make up the economic, the political, and the military elites. At the top of the economy, among the corporate rich, there are the chief executives; at the top of the 2 Cf. Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills, Character and Social Structure (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1953), pp. 457ff. 4 political order, the members of the political directorate; at the top of the military establishment, the elite of soldier-statesmen clustered in and around the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the upper echelon. As each of these domains has coincided with the others, as decisions tend to become total in their consequence, the leading men in each of the three domains of power—the warlords, the corporation chieftains, the political directorate—tend to come together, to form the power elite of America. 2 The higher circles in and around these command posts are often thought of in terms of what their members possess: they have a greater share than other people of the things and experiences that are most highly valued. From this point of view, the elite are simply those who have the most of what there is to have, which is generally held to include money, power, and prestige—as well as all the ways of life to which these lead.3 But the elite are not simply those who have the most, for they could not ‘have the most’ were it not for their positions in the great institutions. For such institutions are the necessary bases of power, of wealth, and of prestige, and at the same time, the chief means of exercising power, of acquiring and retaining wealth, and of cashing in the higher claims for prestige. By the powerful we mean, of course, those who are able to realize their will, even if others resist it. No one, accordingly, can be truly powerful unless he has access to the command of major institutions, for it is over these institutional means of power that the truly powerful are, in the first instance, powerful. Higher politicians and key officials of government command such institutional power; so do admirals and generals, and so do the major owners and executives of the larger corporations. Not all power, it is true, is anchored in and exercised by means of such institutions, but only within and through them can power be more or less continuous and important. Wealth also is acquired and held in and through institutions. The pyramid of wealth cannot be understood merely in terms of the very rich; for the great inheriting families, as we shall see; are now supplemented by the corporate institutions of modern society: every one of the very rich families has been and is closely connected—always legally and frequently managerially as well—with one of the multi-million dollar corporations. 3 The statistical idea of choosing some value and calling those who have the most of it an elite derives, in modern times, from the Italian economist, Pareto, who puts the central point in this way: ‘Let us assume that in every branch of human activity each individual is given an index which stands as a sign of his capacity, very much the way grades are given in the various subjects in examinations in school. The highest type of lawyer, for instance, will be given 10. The man who does not get a client will be given 1— reserving zero for the man who is an out-and-out idiot. To the man who has made his millions—honestly or dishonestly as the case may be—we will give 10. To the man who has earned his thousands we will give 6; to such as just manage to keep out of the poor-house, 1, keeping zero for those who get in…. So let us make a class of people who have the highest indices in their branch of activity, and to that class give the name of elite. Vilfredo Pareto, The Mind and Society (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1935), par. 2027 and 2031. Those who follow this approach end up not with one elite, but with a number corresponding to the number of values they select. Like many rather abstract ways of reasoning, this one is useful because it forces us to think in a clear-cut way. For a skillful use of this approach, see the work of Harold D. Lasswell, in particular, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1936); and for a more systematic use, H.D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950). 5 The modern corporation is the prime source of wealth, but, in latter-day capitalism, the political apparatus also opens and closes many avenues to wealth. The amount as well as the source of income, the power over consumer’s goods as well as over productive capital, are determined by position within the political economy. If our interest in the very rich goes beyond their lavish or their miserly consumption, we must examine their relations to modern forms of corporate property as well as to the state; for such relations now determine the chances of men to secure big property and to receive high income. Great prestige increasingly follows the major institutional units of the social structure. It is obvious that prestige depends, often quite decisively, upon access to the publicity machines that are now a central and normal feature of all the big institutions of modern America. Moreover, one feature of these hierarchies of corporation, state, and military establishment is that their top positions are increasingly interchangeable. One result of this is the accumulative nature of prestige. Claims for prestige, for example, may be initially based on military roles, then expressed in and augmented by an educational institution run by corporate executives, and cashed in, finally, in the political order, where, for General Eisenhower and those he represents, power and prestige finally meet at the very peak. Like wealth and power, prestige tends to be cumulative: the more of it you have, the more you can get. These values also tend to be translatable into one another: the wealthy find it easier than the poor to gain power; those with status find it easier than those without it to control opportunities for wealth. If we took the one hundred most powerful men in America, the one hundred wealthiest, and the one hundred most celebrated away from the institutional positions they now occupy, away from their resources of men and women and money, away from the media of mass communication that are now focused upon them—then they would be powerless and poor and uncelebrated. For power is not of a man. Wealth does not center in the person of the wealthy. Celebrity is not inherent in any personality. To be celebrated, to be wealthy, to have power requires access to major institutions, for the institutional positions men occupy determine in large part their chances to have and to hold these valued experiences. 3 The people of the higher circles may also be conceived as members of a top social stratum, as a set of groups whose members know one another, see one another socially and at business, and so, in making decisions, take one another into account. The elite, according to this conception, feel themselves to be, and are felt by others to be, the inner circle of ‘the upper social classes.’4 They form a more or less compact social and psychological entity; they have become self-conscious members of a social class. People are either accepted into this class or 4 The conception of the elite as members of a top social stratum, is, of course, in line with the prevailing common-sense view of stratification. Technically, it is closer to ‘status group’ than to ‘class,’ and has been very well stated by Joseph A. Schumpeter, ‘Social Classes in an Ethically Homogeneous Environment,’ Imperialism and Social Classes (New York: Augustus M. Kelley, Inc., 1951), pp. 133ff., especially pp. 137–47. Cf. also his Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 3rd ed. (New York: Harper, 1950), Part II. For the distinction between class and status groups, see From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (trans and ed. By Gerth and Mills; New York: Oxford University Press, 1946). For an analysis of Pareto’s conception of the elite compared with Marx’s conception of classes, as well as data on France, see Raymond Aron, ‘Social Structures and Ruling Class,’ British Journal of Sociology, vol. I, nos. 1 and 2 (1950). 6 they are not, and there is a qualitative split, rather than merely a numerical scale, separating them from those who are not elite. They are more or less aware of themselves as a social class and they behave toward one another differently from the way they do toward members of other classes. They accept one another, understand one another, marry one another, tend to work and to think if not together at least alike. Now, we do not want by our definition to prejudge whether the elite of the command posts are conscious members of such a socially recognized class, or whether considerable proportions of the elite derive from such a clear and distinct class. These are matters to be investigated. Yet in order to be able to recognize what we intend to investigate, we must note something that all biographies and memoirs of the wealthy and the powerful and the eminent make clear: no matter what else they may be, the people of these higher circles are involved in a set of overlapping ‘crowds’ and intricately connected ‘cliques.’ There is a kind of mutual attraction among those who ‘sit on the same terrace’—although this often becomes clear to them, as well as to others, only at the point at which they feel the need to draw the line; only when, in their common defense, they come to understand what they have in common, and so close their ranks against outsiders. The idea of such ruling stratum implies that most of its members have similar social origins, that throughout their lives they maintain a network of informal connections, and that to some degree there is an interchangeability of position between the various hierarchies of money and power and celebrity. We must, of course, note at once that if such an elite stratum does exist, its social visibility and its form, for very solid historical reasons, are quite different from those of the noble cousinhoods that once ruled various European nations. That American society has never passed through a feudal epoch is of decisive importance to the nature of the American elite, as well as to American society as a historic whole. For it means that no nobility or aristocracy, established before the capitalist era, has stood in tense opposition to the higher bourgeoisie. It means that this bourgeoisie has monopolized not only wealth but prestige and power as well. It means that no set of noble families has commanded the top positions and monopolized the values that are generally held in high esteem; and certainly that no set has done so explicitly by inherited right. It means that no high church dignitaries or court nobilities, no entrenched landlords with honorific accouterments, no monopolist of high army posts have opposed the enriched bourgeoisie and in the name of birth and prerogative successfully resisted its self-making. But this does not mean that there are no upper strata in the United States. That they emerged from a ‘middle class’ that had no recognized aristocratic superiors does not mean they remained middle class when enormous increases in wealth made their own superiority possible. Their origins and their newness may have made the upper strata less visible in America than elsewhere. But in America today there are in fact tiers and ranges of wealth and power of which people in the middle and lower ranks know very little and may not even dream. There are families who, in their well-being, are quite insulated from the economic jolts and lurches felt by the merely prosperous and those farther down the scale. There are also men of power who in quite small groups make decisions of enormous consequence for the underlying population. The American elite entered modern history as a virtually unopposed bourgeoisie. No national bourgeoisie, before or since, has had such opportunities and advantages. Having no military neighbors, they easily occupied an isolated continent stocked with natural resources and immensely inviting to a willing labor force. A framework of power and an ideology for its 7 8 justification were already at hand. Against mercantilist restriction, they inherited the principle of laissez-faire; against Southern planters, they imposed the principle of industrialism. The Revolutionary War put an end to colonial pretensions to nobility, as loyalists fled the country and many estates were broken up. The Jacksonian upheaval with its status revolution put an end to pretensions to monopoly of descent by the old New England families. The Civil War broke the power, and so in due course the prestige, of the ante-bellum South’s claimants for the higher esteem. The tempo of the whole capitalist development made it impossible for an inherited nobility to develop and endure in America. No fixed ruling class, anchored in agrarian life and coming to flower in military glory, could contain in America the historic thrust of commerce and industry, or subordinate to itself the capitalist elite—as capitalists were subordinated, for example, in Germany and Japan. Nor could such a ruling class anywhere in the world contain that of the United States when industrialized violence came to decide history. Witness the fate of Germany and Japan in the two world wars of the twentieth century; and indeed the fate of Britain herself and her model ruling class, as New York became the inevitable economic, and Washington the inevitable political capital of the western capitalist world….
How Europe Underdeveloped Africa: This book derives from a concern with the contemporary African situation. It delves into the past only because otherwise it would be impossible to understand how the present came into being and what the trends are for the near future. In the search for an understanding of what is now called “underdevelopment” in Africa, the limits of enquiry have had to be fixed as far apart as the fifteenth century, on the one hand and the end of the colonial period, on the other hand. Ideally. an analysis of underdevelopment should come even closer to the present than the end of the colonial period in the 1960s. The phenomenon of neo-colonialism cries out for extensive investigation in order to formulate the strategy and tactics of African emancipation and development.
Walter Rodney: How Europe Underdeveloped Africa Audiobook – Chapter 1
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nsSoIv-8Fa8
How Europe Underdeveloped Africa.
Walter Rodney 1973
Preface
This book derives from a concern with the contemporary African situation. It delves into the past only because otherwise it would be impossible to understand how the present came into being and what the trends are for the near future. In the search for an understanding of what is now called “underdevelopment” in Africa, the limits of enquiry have had to be fixed as far apart as the fifteenth century, on the one hand and the end of the colonial period, on the other hand. Ideally. an analysis of underdevelopment should come even closer to the present than the end of the colonial period in the 1960s. The phenomenon of neo-colonialism cries out for extensive investigation in order to formulate the strategy and tactics of African emancipation and development. This study does not go that far, but at least certain solutions are implicit in a correct historical evaluation, just as given medical remedies are indicated or contra-indicated by a correct diagnosis of a patient’s condition and an accurate case-history. Hopefully, the facts and interpretation that follow will make a small contribution towards reinforcing the conclusion that African development is possible only on the basis of a radical break with the international capitalist system, which has been the principal agency of underdevelopment of Africa over the last five centuries. As the reader will observe, the question of development strategy is tackled briefly in the final section by A.M. Babu, former Minister of http://www.marxists.org/subject/africa/rodney-walter/how-europe/preface.htm (1 of 2) [8/22/05 11:02:45 AM] How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. Walter Rodney 1973 Economic Affairs and Development Planning, who has been actively involved in fashioning policy along those lines in the Tanzanian context [n.b.: not included in this reprint]. It is no accident that the text as a whole has been written within Tanzania, where expressions of concern for development have been accompanied by considerably more positive action than in several other parts of the continent. Many colleagues and comrades shared in the preparation of this work. Special thanks must go to comrades Karim Hirji and Henry Mapolu of the University of Dar es Salaam, who read the manuscript in a spirit of constructive criticism. But, contrary to the fashion in most prefaces, I will not add that “all mistakes and shortcomings are entirely my responsibility.” That is sheer bourgeois subjectivism. Responsibility in matters of these sorts is always collective, especially with regard to the remedying of shortcomings. My thanks also go to the Tanzania Publishing House and Bogle L’Ouverture Publications for co-operating in producing this volume as simply and cheaply as possible. The purpose has been to try and reach Africans who wish to explore further the nature of their exploitation, rather than to satisfy the ‘standard, set by our oppressors and their spokesmen in the academic world.
Walter Rodney. Dar es Salaam.
The full book as pdf:
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Peace as a civilization project: The civilizing hexagon by Senghaas
Peace as a civilization project: The civilizing hexagon by Senghaas
The following extract by Michael Zürn addresses the so-called civilizing hexagon and, as such, highlights a core element of the approach taken by the pre-eminent peace researcher Dieter Senghaas. As far as its place in the war-peace continuum is concerned, the civilizing aspect plays a core role and is referred to continually throughout this basic course:
But what does civilizing actually mean? Senghaas attempted to answer this question. His peace theory interprets peace as a civilizing project, and it is explained in the following extract:
“As far as this configurational way of thinking is concerned, successful government, in the sense of achieving or approaching a situation in which the fundamental values of society are met, and the peaceful coexistence of people become one. The objectives of government (…) are one and the same with the conditions for peace. The different state objectives and aims encompassed by government are linked up to the Senghaas’ peace theory using a ‘civilizing hexagon,’ which demonstrates a good and working internal state order and the ability for peace-orientated foreign affairs. (…)
It is only possible to overcome a system of organized lack of peace by means of a civilizing project. The most important aspects associated with the peace civilizing project are revealed by examining the conditions which make internal peace possible in modern Western industrialized societies. Senghaas wanted to develop a wide peace concept without getting bogged down in the involved concepts associated with the terms ‘negative peace’ (= absence of war) and ‘positive peace’ (= absence of structural aggression), and it was for this reason that he developed the civilizing hexagon. According the hexagon, peace occurs when a collection of conditions is present that provide mutual support for each other (…).
A civilizing hexagon of this kind has six cornerstones which can be described as follows:
1) The de-privatization of aggression and the establishment of a legitimate state monopoly of aggression is essential for the civilizing project. There can be no lasting peace without ‘the disarmament of the citizens’ (…).
2) On the other hand, however, control of the state monopoly on aggression and the establishment of a constitutional state are needed to make sure that state monopoly of aggression is not abused in a despotic way.
3) Increasing control over emotional states through mutual interaction is established by growing interdependency and by the de-privatization of aggression; this is referred to by Norbert Elias impressively as the ‘process of civilization.’ The consequences of this might also lead to the establishment of ’emotional spheres,’ which transcend local boundaries and lead to a ‘national identity.’
4) This also serves in laying the foundations for democratic participation in the public decision-making process.
5) Another aspect is social justice. The physical fortification of the rule of law is a constitutive condition for the ability of constitutional state orders to be sustained and, as a consequence, inner peace to exist.
6) And, finally, a constructive conflict culture provides the foundations for disagreements to be resolved in a constructive way and for compromise-orientated conflict skills, and makes up the last cornerstone in the hexagon.
To this end, then, peace as a civilizing project becomes the desire for a legitimate and just state order. This also means that effective civilizing and peace are in a sense ‘identical.’ When peace is understood in this way, it becomes clear that it’s not a natural state. ‘Peace has to be created.’ Or to put it another way: ‘If the aim is to achieve peace in the sense of civilizing politics (…), the ground for peace has to be prepared: Si vis pacem, para pacem.'”
[Taken from: Michael Zürn: Vom Nationalstaat lernen, Das zivilisatorische Hexagon in der Weltinnenpolitik, in: Ulrich Menzel (Hrsg.): Vom Ewigen Frieden und vom Wohlstand der Nationen, Frankfurt am Main 2000, p. 21-25]
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Dieter Senghaas
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Dieter Senghaas (born August 27, 1940, in Geislingen an der Steige) is a German social scientist and peace researcher.[citation needed]
Scientific work
Work concerning the East-West conflict[edit]
In the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, Senghaas took a close look at the armament dynamics and the system of deterrence in the East-West conflict. Senghaas recognised an autistic structure in the deterrence situation of the Cold War, which according to Senghaas, was mostly driven from the inside and less from the outside (international processes). Senghaas’ criticism of deterrence and his analysis of armament dynamics and control contributed to the development of critical peace research.[citation needed]
Work concerning the North-South conflict[edit]
In his three compilations, “Imperialismus und strukturelle Gewalt (1972)” (Imperialism and Structural Power), “Peripherer Kapitalismus. Analysen über Abhängigkeit und Unterentwicklung (1974)” (Peripheral Capitalism. Analyses of Dependency and Underdevelopment) and “Kapitalistische Weltökonomie. Kontroversen über ihren Ursprung und ihre Entwicklungsdynamik (1979)” (Capitalistic World Economy. Controversies about its Origin and its Development Dynamics), as well as in his 1977 book, “Weltwirtschaftsordnung und Entwicklungspolitik. Plädoyer für Dissoziation” (World Economic Order and Development Policy. Plea for Dissociation), Senghaas attempts to make visible the structural dependency of the periphery on the metropolises, or stated more simply, the dependence of the developing countries (or areas) on the political and economic power centers in the age of world economy. Senghaas sees a solution to the impediments to development, created externally (pressure of the industrial countries) and internally (interests of the power elite in keeping the existing societal structures), in a decoupling (not severance!) at times from the world market. In this decoupling phase, the concentration should be upon the development of the economic form of the developing countries, which should be the satisfaction of the local population, if possible exploiting local resources (with which Senghaas does not mean striving for economic self-sufficiency). With this way of looking at things, Senghaas also simultaneously rejected the idea prevalent at that time that simply integrating the Third World into the existing world economic order could solve the development problems of the Third World. As of the middle of the 1970s, Senghaas attempted to strengthen his theory by analysing the developing socialist countries of Albania, the People’s Republic of China, North Korea and Cuba. For Senghaas, socialism did not represent a post-capitalist production system. Much more (independently of the intentions of the respective leader or regime), socialism could accomplish an economic development, which would not have been possible in that way under capitalistic conditions. In his analysis, Senghaas came to the conclusion that the development of states proceeded positively in the beginning, but then came increasingly to a standstill due to the absence of reforms, a more and more complex system of business and society and an increasingly inflexible political order (results in the middle of the 1980s). From the results of the analysis, several country monographs and an article on the status of socialism regarding historical development were created in cooperations with Frankfurt graduate students. Dieter Senghaas decisively left his mark on the discussion of theoretical development within international relations in Germany with his works about the possibilities of independent development processes in dependency of the given international conditions (economic and political).[citation needed]
The civilizational hexagon[edit]
Dieter Senghaas’ “civilizational hexagon” joins load-bearing building blocks together for a stable maintenance of peace. This peacekeeping and its supervision of itself is regarded as a civilising project. The hexagon consists of six building blocks, which are all linked to each other, since they all depend on each other. A fundamental building block is the monopoly on the use of force, which means the de-privatisation of force and its authorization, that is, “disarmament of the citizens”. The next building block, the rule of law, comprises the control of the monopoly of force, which has as a precondition that the public monopoly of force is not despotically abused. Since without a check on the monopoly of force, it would be nothing less than a dictatorship. The third building block, democratic participation, means democratic involvement of the public in elections and other decision making, since without this right of the people to contribute, they would not obey the professed laws. The trust of the people must also be secured by equal rights, so that they comply with such regulations. This occurs, among other things, through the building block of social justice, which provides for a just verdict from a neutral court when there is a violation of the law, but also takes care of safeguarding the basic necessities of every person. The next building block falls under the heading of constructive conflict culture, which describes the capability for tolerance in a multi-cultural society and a willingness for compromise-oriented conflict solution. The last building block of the hexagon is interdependencies and control of emotion. The purpose of this building block is the mutual dependency among people and their control of themselves in conflict situations.[1][citation needed]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dieter_Senghaas#The_civilizational_hexagon
The Civilisation of Conflict:
Constructive Pacifism as a Guiding Notion for Conflict Transformation
1. Introduction 2 2. A New World Order 2 3. Social and political transformation in the 20th Century 3 4. Conditions for the peaceful regulation of conflict 4 5. The reluctant development of a culture of constructive conflict management 5 6. Alternative responses to social and political transformations 7 7. Building an international culture of constructive conflict management 9 8. Peace policy 10 9. A global system for peace 10 10. Activities to promote a global system of peace 11 11. Reference and Further Reading 12 Dieter Senghaas The Civilisation of Conflict: Constructive Pacifism as a Guiding Notion for Conflict Transformation © Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management – Edited version Aug 2004 (First launch Mar 2001) http://www.berghof-handbook.net Dieter Senghaas The Civilization of Conflict: Constructive Pacifism as a Guiding Notion for Conflict Transformation 2 © Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management The Civilisation of Conflict: Constructive Pacifism as a Guiding Notion for Conflict Transformation Dieter Senghaas 1. Introduction How, and by what means, is peace constituted? In the first two decades of the twentieth century, a leading pacifist, Alfred H. Fried, set this fundamental question at the heart of the pacifist programme. Causal pacifism was the key term: „If we wish to eliminate an effect, we must first remove its cause. And if we wish to set a new and desirable effect in its place, we must substitute the cause with another which is capable of creating the desired effect“ (Fried 1918, 10). This sounds abstract in terms of its methodology, but was posed as something quite specific: If war is the outcome of international anarchy, which still prevails in relations between states, this anarchy itself must be abolished in order to remove its effect, which is war. Moreover, in place of anarchy, a ‚social order‘ must be established whose effect is to allow conflicts in general to be managed in a non-violent reliable manner. In other words – in the political sense of the term – peace is created. The doctrine of causal or cause/effect pacifism is therefore rooted in an attempt to think systematically about the prerequisites and conditions for peace. In an analytical sense, then, it was comparable with the current endeavours to develop a peace theory which is appropriate for the modern age, including a programme of constructive conflict management that is compatible with this theory (Senghaas 1995; Czempiel 1998). Irrespective of whether or not this specific term was used by individual authors, causal pacifism was a key academic and practical issue in the classical pacifism debate. It is one of the great tragedies of the twentieth century that this concept declined in popularity among pacifist movements and finally became a non-issue. In a twentieth century marked by violence, war, genocide and mutual threats of destruction within the framework of deterrence, antimilitarism – for quite understandable reasons – came to dominate the pacifist agenda and shape its thinking and action. Yet there remained what the Slovenian peace researcher Vlasta Jalusic once described as an ‚empty hole‘: for while antimilitarism seeks to dismantle the structures and mentalities which cause aggression, violence and war, causal pacifism, by contrast, aims to create structures and mentalities that promote lasting peace. In short, causal pacifism and comparable approaches could therefore also be described as ‚constructive pacifism‘ – a pacifism that is geared to the construction and architecture of peace. 2. A New World Order The classical doctrine of causal pacifism was intended – as formulated explicitly by Alfred Fried in 1918 – to establish „a new world order“ (Fried 1918, 42): a new form of global governance. This intention was not rooted in an eschatological goal but in manageable approaches which were „inspired by a purposeful spirit of peace“ (Fried, ibid.). This new world order was defined as the outcome of the „sociation of states“, a process which was already under way and which would culminate in a „contrat social“, or social contract, between states. This would lead not Dieter Senghaas The Civilization of Conflict: Constructive Pacifism as a Guiding Notion for Conflict Transformation 3 © Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management to the abolition of conflict but to what, in current terminology, is known as conflict transformation: „the reshaping of international relations in a way which will imbue conflicts with a character which frees them from violence and makes them entirely suitable for management by legal means“ (Fried 1918, 12). This conflict transformation – ‚transforming the nature of conflict‘ – is precisely what is meant by ‚civilising conflict‘ in the current peace theory debate (Senghaas 1994b; Vogt 1996). In the classical doctrine of causal pacifism, the civilised management of conflicts within states (internal conflicts) was assumed to have been achieved to a greater or lesser extent – successful ‚sociation‘ having already taken place – but this premise can no longer be taken as given today. For a glance around the world reveals that at present: there are virtually no wars any more between states although the international community is still far from being a society of states. Instead, there are numerous military intrastate conflicts, primarily civil wars in many different forms (Gantzel & Schwinghammer 1995). Thus facilitating internal peace – and not only the new world order – once again becomes a key analytical and practical focus for constructive peace analysis. 3. Social and political transformation in the 20th Century When researching the causes of peace and the conditions for internal peace, it is necessary to consider the radical changes which took place first in Western countries but, in recent decades more strikingly in non-Western countries. When the concept of causal pacifism was formulated at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century, the world – especially the majority of today‘s industrialised countries – was still largely agricultural in organisation. Although little has been written about this subject, the last hundred years (1900-2000) will go down in history as the century of the worldwide erosion of the traditional peasant economy (‚depeasantisation‘). Today, most people no longer live in subsistence economies but in entirely commercialised or market economies with an increasingly globalised frame of reference. The developing countries are no exception to this economic transition despite obvious differences exemplified by countries in East Asia and Central Africa. In contrast to agricultural communities in a traditional rural framework, this new socioeconomic environment has greatly expanded people‘s horizons and scope for action. The urbanisation associated with structural change also intensifies communications and – for the first time in history – allows people to organise themselves politically on a broad basis. At the same time, mass literacy has resulted in a broad-based and highly effective mobilisation of intelligence: in other words, it has lead to intellectual emancipation and a skills revolution. People‘s level of competence has been rising dramatically. Thus, a conversion is taking place: „from ignorance to self-consciousness, to an interconnectedness with the world“, as a nun working with the underclasses of Indian society aptly described it some time ago (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Jan. 6, 1999). In contrast to traditional societies, this opens up opportunities for upward mobility. Moreover, the globalised media allows expectations and lifestyles to be both globally compared and illustrated. Indeed, the globalisation of such possibilities or demonstration effects in a graphic way may well have a greater political impact nowadays than the mere globalisation of the economies. Thus traditional societies are evolving into politicisable and, in reality, politicised societies, where traditional identities are challenged and questioned. ‚Truths‘ can no longer be defined in absolute terms. Diverging notions of justice, and interests, proliferate. Given the plurality of projects to reshape and redefine the political order, the question of what constitutes a ‚good society‘ becomes a fundamental problem. The tranquillitas ordinis, the ‚tranquillity of the social Dieter Senghaas The Civilization of Conflict: Constructive Pacifism as a Guiding Notion for Conflict Transformation 4 © Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management order‘ – once the subject of writings by St Augustine and many non-European authors in traditional societies – can no longer be pinpointed. What emerge are modern forms of society which, in terms of their structure, are rife with the potential for conflict and even violence and which – unless they are restrained by dictatorship or despotism – can no longer be reduced to a common denominator. Yet under these new socio-economic and socio-cultural conditions, even dictatorship and despotism are doomed to failure in both the short or long term: for socio-cultural, socio-economic and, consequently, political plurality is unassailable, and the politicisation of identities, truths, notions of justice and interests is irreversible because it emerges from the very basis of socially mobile societies. Moreover, what results from all of this is the demand – presently heard in every corner of the world – for political participation. Fundamental politicisation has occurred, when social, economic and cultural conflicts present themselves as political conflicts, and when political conflicts present themselves as social, economic and cultural conflicts. The key issue, which then arises in an acute form in many societies today, is coexistence despite fundamental politicisation (Senghaas 1998; 2001). The dubious alternative to peaceful coexistence – in an extreme case – is civil war, as political events around the globe demonstrate each and every day. 4. Conditions for the peaceful regulation of conflict But how can civil war be avoided in this situation? This transformation of the world in which we live was initially the outcome of the agrarian and industrial revolutions from the mideighteenth century and especially in the nineteenth century in Western Europe. This, then, was where the issue outlined here – i.e. coexistence despite fundamental politicisation – first became acute; as a result, some of the conclusions drawn from the experience and debate about these issues are most readily available in Western Europe (Senghaas 1994b). What then are the essential conditions for the civilised – i.e. the non-violent – resolution of unavoidable conflict? In the light of the European experience six cornerstones can be identified: The first is a legitimate monopoly of force by the state, i.e. safeguarding the community based on the rule of law, which is of paramount importance for any modern peace-order. Disarming citizens is the only way to force them to conduct their conflicts over identity and interests through argument rather than violence. Only when these conditions are in place can potential conflict parties be compelled to deal with their conflicts through argument and thus through deliberative politics in the public arena. The crucial importance of this condition becomes apparent wherever the monopoly of force breaks down and citizens re-arm again, with the re-emergence of feuds and warlords – presently a common feature of military conflicts all over the world. Secondly, such a monopoly of force also creates a need for control under the rule of law that can only be guaranteed by, and indeed, epitomises, the modern constitutional state. Without this control, the monopoly of force is simply a euphemistic way of describing the arbitrary behaviour of dictatorial rule. The rule of law provides ‚the rules of the game‘ for the shaping of opinion and the political will, as well as for the decision-making process and the enforcement of law. Alongside the general principles that are set forth in catalogues of basic rights, these rules of the game are essential, precisely because in politicised societies serious disagreements on substantive issues prevail. The third major condition for internal peace is affect control, which arises from the range and wealth of many inter-dependences characterising modern societies. Such societies are highly ramified, and people within them play out a variety of roles that reflect their wide span of loyalties. Dieter Senghaas The Civilization of Conflict: Constructive Pacifism as a Guiding Notion for Conflict Transformation 5 © Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management Conflict theory and real-life experience show that highly diverse social roles lead to a fragmentation of conflict and thus to the moderation of conflict behaviour and affect control: Without affect control, in complex environments such as modernising and modern societies, peaceful social relations would be inconceivable. On the other hand, fourth, democratic participation is essential, precisely due to the indispensability of affect control. ‚Legal unrest‘ – Rechtsunruhe in the term of Sigmund Freud – will result from situations where people are unable to become involved in public affairs, either for ethnic or other forms of discrimination, and at worst a conflict will escalate and, in politicised societies, can become a hotbed of violence. So democracy, as the basis for legal development, is not a luxury but a necessary precondition for the peaceful resolution of conflicts. Fifth, however, in politicised societies, this approach to conflict management will only have permanence if there are continual efforts to ensure social justice. The great majority of modern capitalist societies are run on market lines, and social inequality is ever present. Unless efforts are continually made to counter this dynamic of inequality, such societies will develop deep social fissures. Therefore if the credibility of the constitutional state is not to be called into question by disadvantaged individuals or groups, on the grounds that the rules of the game are no longer fair, there must be an ongoing effort to ensure distributive justice. By contrast, genuine efforts to achieve social justice and fairness give substance to constructive conflict management, and also provide legitimacy to public institutions. If there are fair opportunities in the public arena to articulate identities and achieve a balance between diverse interests, it may be assumed that this approach to conflict management has been reliably internalized and that conflict management competence based on compromise – including the necessary tolerance – has thus become an integral element of political action. The legitimate monopoly of force, the rule of law and democracy – in short, the modern democratic constitutional state – become anchored in political culture. The culture of constructive conflict management thus becomes the emotional basis of the community. Material measures (‚social justice‘) emerge as an important bridge between the institutional structure and its positive resonance in people‘s emotions (‚public sentiment‘). What develops finally – to use Ralf Dahrendorf‘s phrase – are „ligatures“, in other words, deeply rooted political and cultural bonds and socio-cultural allegiances. 5. The reluctant development of a culture of constructive conflict management The political culture of constructive conflict management does not mark the beginning of modern coexistence. On the contrary, it is a latecomer to the historical process. While similar to the other five cornerstones identified above, in the past it had no place in Europe‘s traditional – i.e. pre-modern – culture. On the contrary, the emergence of each individual cornerstone can be described far more accurately as a ‚reluctant process‘ or a process contre cœur (Senghaas 1998; 2001): for historically, disarmament was invariably the outcome of defeat in warfare. The strong triumphed over the weak; the superior over the inferior. The rule of law originated in historically contentious compromises which were wrung out of the conflict parties and were naturally unpopular, yet – in fragile power relationships – were viewed first and foremost as temporary concessions. As far as affect control was concerned, self-determined life in clearly defined micro-contexts was always viewed as preferable to integration into self-referential functional systems with their own dynamics. After Sigmund Freud, at the latest, it has been recognised that affect control is governed Dieter Senghaas The Civilization of Conflict: Constructive Pacifism as a Guiding Notion for Conflict Transformation 6 © Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management by the imperatives of the reality principle and not the pleasure principle: in other words, it cannot be achieved without a substantial measure of affective sublimation. The struggle for greater participation, too, always took place against entrenched opposition. In a world where inequality is endemic, the same applies to the struggle for fairness and distributive justice: Political participation and fair distribution had to be forced out of the power holders in every case. Finally, a culture of constructive conflict management could only be established under a fortunate combination of circumstances, i.e. when each cornerstone of civility, defined above, became a historic and mutually reinforcing reality which was finally anchored in people‘s emotions. Only under these extremely favourable conditions were the civilisation of conflict and thus the fundamental principle of non-violent conflict management likely to take root in an environment dominated by fundamental politicisation. The process itself must therefore be viewed as the historical outcome of many conflicts that, in the European context, took place progressively as described above. What emerges is a model of conflict management, to be labelled the civilisational hexagon (Senghaas 1994b; Calließ 1997) that has constitutional, institutional and material dimensions but is also characterised by specific mentalities and, in sum – and this must be underlined – represents an artificial product of the civilising process: It can be plausibly argued that the conditions which characterise fundamental politicisation in emancipated mass societies, such as absolutist claims, the fixation on particular interests, the emphasis on specific identity, possessive individualism and lobbyist pressure are in some ways ‚natural‘, whereas tolerance, an awareness of the rules of the game, moderation, the separation of powers, the willingness to compromise, and a sensitivity to more than just one‘s own interests tend to be ‚artificial‘, i.e. the outcome of laborious collective learning processes. Especially in Europe, all these broad-based civilisational achievements, were hard-won in the face of – and in conflict with – the old indigenous European estates-dominated social traditions and, indeed, the modern class society which emerged in the nineteenth century. Thus today‘s democratic constitutional state is not the result of cultural or genetic predisposition. Rather, it is the outcome of a series of innovations and, in two and a half millennia of European history, only manifested in its most recent development within the last 150 years (Senghaas 1998; 2001). Box 1: The Civilisational Hexagon monopoly of force independences and affect control social justice and equity constructive conflict management rule of law democratic participation Dieter Senghaas The Civilization of Conflict: Constructive Pacifism as a Guiding Notion for Conflict Transformation 7 © Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management 6. Alternative responses to social and political transformations The lesson which Europe had to learn painfully and laboriously, by trial and error, by direct as well as circuitous or even erroneous routes – namely tolerance as a solution in the face of pluralisation which was initially perceived as a threat – will be repeated, in principle if not in detail, in other parts of the world. Here, too, with the proliferation of fundamental politicisation due to the transition from traditional to socially mobile societies, as described above, mastering the problems of coexistence is a task that can no longer be postponed. Yet as with traditional Europe, there are no viable responses to these modern problems within the conventional culture of traditional non-European communities. The self-perception of these communities was generally cosmocentric: in classical mythology in particular, the cosmos, society and the people within it were regarded as a single entity, forming a well-ordered, well-organised hierarchy whose architecture was static. Within this structure, the actors‘ roles were preordained. Historical self-perception was cyclical in nature, and hence not truly historical in the modern sense, for these cycles – like the rhythms of nature throughout the year or political life (the rise, flowering and fall of imperial structures or empires) – constantly came back to the same starting point. In general, the notion of a plurality of truths was inconceivable since there was only ‚The One Truth‘. If under these premises, the institutions of community and government in particular are seen as an organic unit, conflicts will be viewed as dysfunctional. As in ancient China and elsewhere, conflicts were regarded as ‚the great disorder under Heaven‘ and hence the onset of existing or impending chaos (luan). Counteractive thinking was then seen as a contribution to overcoming this chaos, i.e. as a chaos management strategy whose purpose is to restore ‚cosmic order‘. These notions are no longer helpful as a strategy to resolve modern problems of coexistence. For this reason, and due to force of circumstance in the rest of the world as well, new perspectives on conflict management and therefore new approaches and forms of internal peace must develop which are appropriate for the modern era (Senghaas 1998; 2001). Unlike development in the West, the collective learning processes in the non-European world are not only determined by the radical social and cultural changes taking place locally. They are also shaped by the developments under way in the West. In this context, four distinct responses can be observed in the non-European world: The first is a modernistic, imitative response, which accepts the West‘s challenge as well as its experiences and ‚solutions‘. The West is regarded as a model in the struggles against what is considered to be the burden of one‘s own tradition – including one‘s own traditional culture. In the first half of the twentieth century, such responses could be observed in many places, including China, but they failed to stand the test of time. Today, however, these responses are proving highly successful in two of the four East Asian newly industrialising countries (NICs), namely Korea and Taiwan. These young industrial countries are evolving into ‚newly democratising countries‘, whose political culture – despite its entire local colour – will not differ fundamentally from those of Western countries in the foreseeable future. When the upheavals of modernisation take place and the problems of coexistence become acute, the guardians of tradition appear in various guises: as traditionalists, as reactionaries, but in general as conservatives. They seek to turn back the tide of history and, in particular, to stop the onward march of modernisation. This second type of reaction can be observed all over the world, wherever Western modernism collides with traditional ways of living. Gandhi could be cited as an example in this context, for his philosophy of life was rural, anti-commercial and egalitarian. It favoured small units and consensus-based direct democracy within a manageable framework. Today, similar concepts can still be found in Central Africa in particular. Dieter Senghaas The Civilization of Conflict: Constructive Pacifism as a Guiding Notion for Conflict Transformation 8 © Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management Third, wherever such upheavals occur, semi-modernists can be observed. They are enthusiastic about Western know-how, but seek to shield their society from all other intellectual influences. Japan has successfully pursued this course since the middle of the last century, whereas really existing socialism was unsuccessful. More recently, the ‚Singapore School‘ has become a preeminent example of semi-modernism. Another example is Islamic Fundamentalism. However, the political problems of an increasingly complex and pluralising society – whether in Singapore, China, in many Islamic societies, or elsewhere – cannot be resolved, or brought closer to a solution with this type of prescriptive programme of governance, least of all in those places where there is a reliance on theocratic approaches which are rooted in Islamic Fundamentalism. These latter endeavours (as presently in Iran) have fascinating historical parallels, but also demonstrate the futility of the ‚theocratic counter-revolution‘ against modernism, which could also be observed in Europe – and especially in France itself – during the first half of the nineteenth century in reaction to the French Revolution. In such a theocratic programme, pluralism was – and is – regarded as an immoral concept which in practice destroys the fabric of society, breaks down traditional values and culture, and represents the epitome of moral blindness (jahiliyya). On the other hand they regarded as entirely appropriate for the modern day the untrammelled religiously-motivated exercise of power. Ultimately, however, whenever modernism and traditions collide and social upheavals occur in the non-European world, innovations will be required. As with Europe, these changes in the non-European regions cannot be predicted with certainty. Nonetheless, Europe‘s experience is likely to be repeated in some places: As soon as traditional culture is confronted with modernising tendencies and societies undergo a structural and therefore also a mental shift, these cultures – with bitter inevitability – come into conflict with themselves. This triggers the necessary collective learning processes – and may also prompt problematic and undesirable developments. According to the theory of The End of History (Fukuyama 1922), all innovations of modernism have already been realised exhaustively in the Western/European countries and nonEuropean countries have nothing more to offer in terms of dealing with the problems of coexistence. Contrary to this theory, however, four-fifths of humanity again in the coming decades will be compelled, generally against their will, to experiment with finding locally appropriate solutions to the problems of social mobility and fundamental politicisation. The solutions that ultimately prove their worth are unlikely to be invented as abstract concepts on the drawing board. What is more likely in this context is a repetition of the European experience: the arrangements for coexistence and sustainable conflict management – in other words, internal peace – which ultimately prove viable on a long-term basis will have developed as the unintended outcome of political conflicts. Thus the non-European states will not be spared a fate similar to Europe‘s laborious, painful and conflict-ridden journey towards the democratic constitutional state, its institutions and ethos. The process will be similar to the European experience, although its outcome may be different, especially if genuine innovations are actually to take place. However, in this latter case, in particular, the outcome would not reflect the profound dimensions of conventional culture, but new aspects – against its own traditions. Viewed on a global level, one of the great challenges for humanity in the twenty-first century is to find the solution to pluralisation in patterns of tolerance – a tolerance that is safeguarded at the institutional level and anchored in people‘s emotions. This challenge is no less weighty an issue than the burgeoning environmental problems world-wide. A glance back to the twentieth century demonstrates the urgency of this problem. During that century, many ‚alternatives‘ to tolerance were tested in barbaric and brutal ways: exclusion, ghettoisation, apartheid, expulsion, ethnic cleansing or genocide, and civil wars in many different forms (Heinsohn 1998; Dabag and Platt 1998). Dieter Senghaas The Civilization of Conflict: Constructive Pacifism as a Guiding Notion for Conflict Transformation 9 © Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management In contrast to causal pacifism at the beginning of the twentieth century, the irreversible nature of pluralisation therefore means that the quest for a legal, institutional, material and psychological system of coexistence within societies remains at the top of the agenda. The need to reach internal peace is therefore not a peripheral problem; today more than ever, it is an acute, life-threatening and global problem. In every corner of the world, acceptance of traditional and conventional structures is declining; as a result, conflicts of interests and orientation, power struggles and cultural clashes, motivated by the search for new social and political structures, are unavoidable. 7. Building an international culture of constructive conflict management What is a difficult task even within individual societies, and what, even under the best of conditions, can only be considered a fragile achievement with no guarantee of permanency – the shaky stability of internal peace – seems all the more difficult at the international level, namely achieving and safeguarding international coexistence (Falk 1995; Ferencz 1994). States have still not disarmed, despite the fact that under international law, a fundamental ban on the use of force has existed in the United Nations (UN) Charter since 1945: The UN Security Council has in principle a ‚monopoly of force‘ based on the UN system of collective security, though it must be conceded that it is problematic. The question of what might be implied by ‚control through the rule of law at the international level‘ has only begun to be discussed in recent years (Bauer 1996; Gading 1996; Lailach 1998). Who, for example, is actually authorised at the international level to exercise control over the Security Council, the body entrusted under the United Nations Charter with this quasi monopoly of force? Where is the authority responsible for dealing with complaints against Security Council decisions, when such decisions are considered by those affected to constitute a breach of international law? (Bedjaoui 1995; Falk 1993; Höffe 1999; Martenczuk 1996; Zürn and Zangl 1999). Furthermore, it is true that striking processes of internationalisation, transnationalisation or – as it has become fashionable to term it – globalisation are under way (Beisheim et al. 1999). However, these processes are taking place in what is still a deeply divided world that generates very few system-related (and globally effective) constraints on affect control (Senghaas 1994a). Only in technical/functional areas, such as international air transport, do universally accepted rules exist. Imagine if there were comparable rules for the transactions of international finance, whose function would be to domesticate the psychology of the stock markets! What might democratic participation at global level entail? Who – apart from the states, which do this already – would have to organise themselves at international level, and how would they have to do it, in order to satisfy the democratic imperative and avert violent conflict? Would interest groups be represented alongside governments – such as employers‘ and employees‘ associations, alongside the states, in the International Labour Organisation (ILO) – or, indeed, professional associations, cultural and religious communities of every kind and size, and multinational companies? And what about the often-quoted ‚civil society‘ – the many non-government organisations (NGOs) such as Greenpeace, Amnesty International? But what are the bases of their mandate? Indeed, what form would a representative democratic constitution take at international level? What would ‚participation by citizens‘ mean in this context? (Archibugi and Held 1995; Held 1995; Höffe 1999). Question after question arises, to which – in view of the gradually emerging „postnational constellation“ (Habermas 1998; Zürn 1998) – a solution must be found in the twenty-first century. Dieter Senghaas The Civilization of Conflict: Constructive Pacifism as a Guiding Notion for Conflict Transformation 10 © Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management In other respects, it can be assumed that at the international level, too, the chances of civilising conflict remain slim if no efforts are made to eliminate inequalities and at least to work towards fair distribution. Only if serious and purposeful efforts are undertaken will it be possible to prevent the kind of build-up of ultimately uncontrollable explosive political force generated by the dynamics of privilege and discrimination (Brieskorn 1997). Only then – underpinned in substantive terms – will a culture of constructive conflict management have a chance at the international level (Bobbio 1998). 8. Peace policy If we examine the experiences with internal peace and the requirements for international peace and an appropriate order, it can be stated with regard to dependable and civilised management of conflict or lasting peace (Senghaas D. and Senghaas E. 1996) that peace, defined as the lasting and sustainable civilising of conflict, must be viewed as a non-violent political process geared to preventing the use of force. Through this process, agreements and compromises must be used to create conditions which enable peaceful relations to be established between social groups or between states and nations, without jeopardising their existence, and without violating the perceptions of justice or interests of individuals and groups so seriously that, after exhausting all peaceful remedies, they deem it necessary to resort to violence. Shaped in this way, peace policy can then be understood as an indispensable, continuous and constructive handling of political virulence which, in the modern world, results from fundamental politicisation. 9. A global system for peace If peace policy is to be successful, even in a smaller arena, i.e. within societies and states, the conditions must be favourable; indeed, adverse conditions often lead to situations in which nonviolent conflict resolution gives way to violence. Nevertheless, as the earlier questions imply, the necessary prerequisites at the global level with regard to the creation of a new world order are even broader in scope since conditions here are far less conducive (Rittberger 1994). The pacifists of the early twentieth century, who endeavoured to formulate constructive concepts of peace, thought in international terms; they genuinely aimed to achieve a world peaceorder. Nowadays, we would call it ‚global governance‘, reflecting the many old and, indeed, very new global interdependences. Nevertheless, they were realistic enough to realise that such an order needs regional or continental building blocks in order to be truly functional. At the regional level, too, political community-building is a difficult collective learning process. This is borne out, in particular, by the experiences with European integration. This integration process requires certain shared basic values, enhanced communications, fair exchange which benefits all parties and above all a responsiveness to the needs and concerns of weaker participants in the integration process. However, such a process of integration at the regional level must be successful, even if only in the European context at first, because this alone will provide proof that a lasting peace-order beyond the national-state is not an illusion, but can be „constituted“ (gestiftet), to use Kant‘s term, on reliable foundations with the prospect of permanence through constitutional, institutional, material and emotional endeavours (Deutsch et al. 1957; Zielinski 1995; Senghaas 1992). Dieter Senghaas The Civilization of Conflict: Constructive Pacifism as a Guiding Notion for Conflict Transformation 11 © Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management In the efforts to establish global governance, the aim – as clearly identified by the proponents of causal pacifism – is to create an architecture and inner life for a world peace-order: from the lower level, of the peaceful individual state (what a prerequisite!), via its integration into loose or broad-based integrated regional organisations, up to the highest level where international organisations and international rules (international regimes) create sustainable institutional and legally constituted framework conditions for the civilised resolution of unavoidable conflicts. The task is to work against violent conflict at all levels, and, indeed, overcome it in principle. This was once the idea of visionaries; today, this must become a key element of pragmatic realpolitik. 10. Activities to promote a global system of peace Who can be expected to initiate this realpolitik aimed at the creation of global governance? Pacifists with constructive programmes once believed that a new world order would result from the prudent behaviour of leading statesmen; in other words, from clever diplomacy based on internationalist, cosmopolitan norms and with the backing of international organisations. They had no problems with the state per se, as they recognised the qualitative difference between states. Above all, they already understood the meaning of the term ‚rogue state‘ (Fried in Benz 1998, 73). This denoted those actors in the international community who steadfastly refuse to accept the international order. Reflecting the prevailing attitudes and conditions of the day, this pacifist philosophy thus relied heavily on the state and state actors, although for the purposes of civilising the community of states, social movements such as civic, women‘s or socialist pacifist movements and their international networks were considered useful. Anarchist thought was entirely foreign to this brand of pacifism. Admittedly, there are still states with different characters; it would be frivolous to downplay this fact, for it opens up opportunities for civilising conflict. However, the modern world‘s deeper and broader interdependencies mean that, at least in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) the significance of state and statehood is decreasing. Such interdependencies allow not only economic and cultural actors but also social actors in particular to play a role in international politics (Czempiel 1993). Alongside the increasingly economic nature of foreign policy, which has been observed for some time, foreign relations today are also becoming ‚socialised‘. This itself has an impact on foreign policy: The media, interest groups, parties, political foundations, professional associations, NGOs and other social groups are increasingly networked across national borders, with some of them having already acquired remarkable authority (Calließ 1998). Moreover, in the management of disasters and emergencies, but especially in responding to ethno-political conflicts, NGOs are absolutely essential in today‘s world. A new and diverse field of peace policy action is emerging for socially committed citizens, which makes a variety of demands in terms of staff presence and skills. Activities include assisting politically and socially disadvantaged groups (‚empowerment‘), escorting persons in danger, support for refugees, postconflict peacebuilding, reporting on incipient conflicts and signs of escalation (‚early warning‘), observing demonstrations, organising dialogue between hostile groups, mediation and process assistance, the provision of judicial observers, a physical presence in potential and real areas of tension, the provision of electoral observers, and advising official missions such as the UN, Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and European Union (EU) (Merkel 1998). In the longer term, these activities cannot be organised on an ad hoc basis; besides the necessary commitment, they require appropriate training. In other words, what is needed is a Dieter Senghaas The Civilization of Conflict: Constructive Pacifism as a Guiding Notion for Conflict Transformation 12 © Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management problem- and situation-specific ‚civilian peace service‘, or, indeed, a specialised peace service in which civil commitment can be matched by appropriate skills. This opens up another broad new area of activity for constructive pacifism, which also requires preparatory and accompanying research and assessment. However, this has only begun to develop since the 1990s. The need to develop concepts for these peace activities increases with the demand for their services, which reflects real needs, and especially with initial experiences. These experiences – particularly those gained in crisis and conflict situations – demonstrate the extent to which state and civil society actors rely on each other in many instances, even though they operate on different levels and have different target groups (Lederach 1994). Even military security measures may prove indispensable on some occasions to ensure that in armed conflicts, for example, civil society actors are able to play a role at all. Dogmatic fears of inter-agency contact have proved to be counterproductive in this context, whereas shared learning processes – i.e. ‚multi-track activities‘ – have shown themselves to be the way forward (Ropers 1997). 11. Reference and Further Reading Archibugi, Daniele, and David Held (eds.) 1995. Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order, Cambridge: Polity Press. Bauer, Andreas F. 1996. Effektivität und Legitimität. Die Entwicklung der Friedenssicherung durch Zwang nach Kapitel VII der Charta der Vereinten Nationen unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der neueren Praxis des Sicherheitsrates, Berlin: Duncker and Humblot. Bedjaoui, Mohammed 1995. The New World Order and the Security Council: Testing the Legality of its Acts, Dodrecht: Nijhoff. Beisheim, Marianne et al. 1999. Im Zeitalter der Globalisierung? Thesen und Daten zur gesellschaftlichen und politischen Denationalisierung, Baden-Baden: Nomos. Benz, Wolfgang (ed.) 1988. Pazifismus in Deutschland, Frankfurt am Main: Fischer. Bobbio, Norberto 1998. Das Zeitalter der Menschenrechte. Ist Toleranz durchsetzbar?, Berlin: Wagenbach. Boulding, Kenneth 1978. Stable Peace, Austin: University of Texas Press. Brieskorn, Norbert (ed.) 1997. Globale Solidarität, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. Calließ, Jörg (ed.) 1997. Wodurch und wie konstituiert sich Frieden? Das zivilisatorische Hexagon auf dem Prüfstand, Loccum: Ev. Akademie. Calließ, Jörg (ed.) 1998. Barfuß auf diplomatischem Parkett. Die Nichtregierungsorganisationen in der Weltpolitik, Loccum: Ev. Akademie. Czempiel, Ernst-Otto 1993. Weltpolitik im Umbruch, München: Beck. Czempiel, Ernst-Otto 1998. Friedensstrategien, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. Dabag, Mihran and Kristin Platt (eds.) 1998. Genozid und Moderne, Bd. 1., Opladen: Leske & Budrich. Deutsch, Karl W. et al. 1957. Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Falk, Richard et al. (eds.) 1993. The Constitutional Foundations of World Peace, New York: State University of New York Press. Falk, Richard 1995. On Humane Governance: Toward a New Global Politics, Oxford: Polity Press. Ferencz, Benjamin B. 1994. New Legal Foundations for Global Survival: Security Through the Security Council, New York: Oceana. Fried, Alfred H. 1918. Probleme der Friedenstechnik, Leipzig: Verlag Naturwissenschaften. Dieter Senghaas The Civilization of Conflict: Constructive Pacifism as a Guiding Notion for Conflict Transformation 13 © Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management Fukuyama, Francis 1992. The End of History and the Last Man, New York: The Free Press. Gading, Heike 1996. Der Schutz grundlegender Menschenrechte durch militärische Maßnahmen des Sicherheitsrates – das Ende staatlicher Souveränität?, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. Gantzel, Klaus-Jürgen and Torsten Schwinghammer 1995. Die Kriege nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg 1945 bis 1992. Daten und Tendenzen, Münster/Hamburg: Lit. Habermas, Jürgen 1998. Die postnationale Konstellation, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Heinsohn, Gunnar 1998. Lexikon der Völkermorde, Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt. Held, David 1995. Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance, Cambridge: Polity Press. Höffe, Otfried 1999. Demokratie im Zeitalter der Globalisierung, München: Beck. Krell, Gret and Harald Müller (eds.) 1994. Frieden und Konflikt in den internationalen Beziehungen, Frankfurt am Main: Campus. Lailach, Martin 1998. Die Wahrung des Weltfriedens und der internationalen Sicherheit als Aufgabe des Sicherheitsrates der Vereinten Nationen, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. Lederach, John Paul 1994. Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies, Washington: US Institute of Peace Press. Martenczuk, Bernd 1996. Rechtsbindung und Rechtskontrolle des Weltsicherheitsrates, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. Merkel, Christine (ed.) 1998. Friedenspolitik der Zivilgesellschaft, Münster: Agenda. Meyer, Berthold (ed.) 1996. Eine Welt oder Chaos?, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Rittberger, Volker 1994. Internationale Organisationen. Politik und Geschichte, Opladen: Leske & Budrich. Ropers, Norbert 1997. „Prävention und Friedenskonsolidierung als Aufgabe für gesellschaftliche Akteure“, in Senghaas, op. cit., 219-242. Senghaas, Dieter 1992. Friedensprojekt Europa, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Senghaas, Dieter 1994a. „Interdependenzen im internationalen System“, in Krell and Müller (eds.), op. cit., 190–222. Senghaas, Dieter 1994b. Wohin driftet die Welt? Über die Zukunft friedlicher Koexistenz, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Senghaas, Dieter (ed.) 1995. Den Frieden denken, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Senghaas, Dieter (ed.) 1997. Frieden machen, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Senghaas, Dieter (ed.) 1998. Zivilisierung wider Willen. Der Konflikt der Kulturen mit sich selbst, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Senghaas, Dieter 2001. The Clash Within Civilizations: Coming to Terms with Cultural Conflicts, London/New York: Routledge. Senghaas, Dieter and Eva Senghaas 1996. „Si vis pacem, para pacem – Überlegungen zu einem zeitgemäßen Friedenskonzept“, in Berthold Meyer, op. cit. 245–275. Vogt, Wolfgang R. (ed.) 1996. Frieden durch Zivilisierung? Probleme – Ansätze – Perspektiven, Münster: Agenda. Zielinski, Michael 1995. Friedensursachen. Genese und konstituierende Bedingungen von Friedensgemeinschaften am Beispiel der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Entwicklung ihrer Beziehungen zu den USA, Frankreich und den Niederlanden, Baden-Baden: Nomos. Zürn, Michael 1998. Regieren jenseits des Nationalstaates, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Zürn, Michael and Bernhard Zangl 1999. „Weltpolizei oder Weltinterventionsgericht? Zur Zivilisierung der Konfliktbearbeitung“, Internationale Politik, 54:8, 17–24.
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Foreign Policy (Self-description: A Trusted Advisor for Global Leaders): Position of a leading neoconservative in the US: “Think of two significant trend lines in the world today. One is the increasing ambition and activism of the two great revisionist powers, Russia and China. The other is the declining confidence, capacity, and will of the democratic world, and especially of the United States, to maintain the dominant position it has held in the international system since 1945. Peacemaker asks: Where is the idea of the UN-Charter of global and peaceful cooperation of equal nations?
Backing Into World War III
America must check the assertive, rising powers of Russia and China before it’s too late. Accepting spheres of influence is a recipe for disaster.
let´s create peace! 